Enhancing traceability with EPCIS 2.0 and the CBV

The gateway framing matters for this topic: epcis.dev accepts an event only after validating it against GS1's own schema, stamps the capturing account — capturedBy, the warrantor, kept distinct from who, the attested observer — identifies it by its CBV 2.0 hash, and appends it to a store nothing rewrites. What follows stands on those mechanics.

Traceability holds only when the record would hold up out of context: validated at capture against GS1's official schema, identified by the standard's own hash, appended and never edited, with the capturing account stamped by the gateway rather than asserted by the sender. That is what turns a trace from a report someone compiled into evidence someone else can check.

Reads are minimally scoped. You see your own scope; what is outside it is absent, not greyed out and not redacted, so there is no shape left behind to argue about. Recording an event is $0 by policy — intent, until published terms bind it — because a stream that charges per event is one you stop feeding the month the bill grows with volume.

Two attributions travel with every event, and the door owns a different half of each. capturedBy is the warrantor — the account whose key opened the door — stamped by the gateway together with recordTime and the attestation grade, with caller-supplied values in those stamped fields stripped. who is the attested observer, asserted by the caller and graded by the door: it reaches only the grade claimed until identity attestation lands. One is stamped, the other is graded; they never merge.

Provenance: an aged epcis.dev page, kept at its original URL and refreshed into the current design on 15 August 2026.

Proof, not adjectives. The gateway's conformance tests pass against GS1's normative artifacts, and the calculators answer on this origin — POST /translate, /validate, /hash, no key. The dated ledger is What ships today.